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Abstract
Even with the onset of the health-conscious ’80s, approximately
thirty-eight percent of adult males and thirty percent of adult females
actively smoke tobacco products.
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I.

Introduction

Even with the onset of the health-conscious '80s, approximately
thirty-eight percent of adult males and thirty percent of adult females
actively smoke tobacco products." Although these figures are down
from their 1965 counterparts of fifty-two and thirty-four percent,2 active smokers make up a substantial minority of the population. More
than thirty million Americans have quit smoking,$ and millions more
are trying. The major catalyst for this decline was the 1964 Surgeon
General's report which revealed the dangers of tobacco smoking to the
public for the first time. This information eventually led the federal
government to require warning labels on cigarette packs and abolish
cigarette television commercials. 5 Unfortunate discoveries about tobacco smoke continued, with the possibility of harm to nonsmokers first
suggested in the 1972 Surgeon General's Report.6 The 1979 Surgeon
General's report 7 and many scientific and medical studies confirmed
that suspicion.8
As a result of these findings, nonsmokers, previously willing to endure the annoyance caused them by the smell and irritation of tobacco
smoke, realized that they were smoking tobacco products involuntarily,
simply by being exposed to tobacco smoke.' A proliferation of legal
1. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE 367 (1st
ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983
2. Id.

3. PUBLIC HEALTH
WELFARE, SMOKING AND
4. PUBLIC HEALTH
WELFARE, SMOKING AND

REPORT].

SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
HEALTH vii (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 REPORT].
SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
HEALTH (1964). "On the basis of prolonged study and evalu-

ation of many lines of converging evidence, the Committee makes the following judgment: Cigarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient importance in the United
States to warrant appropriate remedial action." Id. at 33
5. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, THE SMOKING DIGEST 34 (1979) [hereinafter cited as SMOKING DIGEST].
6. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
121-31 (1972) [hereinafter
WELFARE, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING
cited as

1972

REPORT].

7. 1979 REPORT, supra note 3, at 11-5-35.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 11-70.
9. Actually the terms nonsmoker and smoker are inaccurate since everyone inhales tobacco smoke and is, therefore a smoker. Involuntary smoker and voluntary
smoker are more accurate terms. See 1979 REPORT, supra note 3, at 11-5. To avoid
confusion this note refers to the involuntary smoker as the nonsmoker.
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actions began when nonsmokers learned of the many harmful effects of
secondary smoke they are forced to inhale. 10 Nonsmokers' efforts to
obtain relief through the courts and their legislatures have met with
inconsistent results.
This note discusses the major issues of nonsmokers' rights, as developed through the courts and legislatures, and explores the possible
emerging issue of the relationship between parental smoking and the
negligent treatment of children. As a primary objective, this note focuses upon the current rights of nonsmokers in Florida and advocates
the enactment of a Florida Clean Indoor Air Act.
II.

The Underlying Premise: Injury to the Nonsmoker

Regardless of which legal forum the nonsmoker elects to seek relief, essential to his argument is the premise that unavoidable contact
with secondary tobacco smoke is harmful to his health, significantly
enough to warrant government intervention. Perhaps because smoking
is still a legitimate social activity and perhaps because the tobacco industry's power and influence through advertising keeps it legitimate,
the general public remains very much unaware of the extent to which
tobacco smoke is believed harmful to the nonsmoker. Although an indepth study of the medical and scientific evidence is better suited for a
medical journal, a basic understanding of the nonsmoker's underlying
premise is so crucial to his argument that a brief overview of the evidence is necessary.
A.

Tobacco Smoke Pollution

The United States Surgeon General's 1975 report asserts that tobacco smoke is a major cause of indoor air pollution.11 In fact, indoor
smoke pollution is potentially more harmful than outdoor pollution,
even on air-pollution emergency days. 12 Scientists have discovered over
4,000 substances in tobacco smoke.13 Many of these substances are
very toxic. "Upwards of 90% of cigarette smoke is composed largely of
a dozen gases that are hazardous to health, and the remainder is par10.
11.

See SMOKING DIGEST, supra note 5, at 77-91.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, PUBLIC HEALTH
SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING 108 (1975).
12. See SMOKING DIGEST, supra note 5, at 26, and Repace & Lowrey, Indoor
Air Pollution, Tobacco Smoke, and Public Health, 208 SCIENCE 464 (1980).
13. 1983 REPORT, supra note 1, at 209, 232.
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ticulate matter.
...
"4 Some of the hazardous chemicals in tobacco
smoke include "tar, nicotine, carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, ammonia, benzene, formaldehyde, and hydrogen sulphide." 15 Hydrogen
cyanide, polonium, hydrocyanic acid, and aldehydes are other toxic
substances found in tobacco smoke.1 6
Tobacco smoke permeates the air from two sources: sidestream
smoke and mainstream smoke.17 Sidestream smoke invades the air directly from the burning end of the tobacco product. Mainstream smoke
is first inhaled by the smoker, then enters the atmosphere when exhaled. Today's common knowledge that mainstream cigarette smoking
is harmful is no great wonder. Yet "[e]ighty to ninety percent of the
volatile and particulate agents and 50% of the carbon monoxide are
filtered out of inhaled smoke before reaching the smoker's lungs. Thus,
the sidestream smoke has twice the toxic material, or more, than the
inhaled or mainstream smoke."""
Most of the tobacco smoke pollution comes from sidestream
smoke. "Even when a smoker inhales into the lung, two-thirds of the
smoke from the burning cigarette goes directly into the environment.
The ratio of pollution from cigar and pipe smoke is even
greater.
...
9 Usually a smoker inhales each cigarette "8-9
times. . . .for a total of 24 seconds, but the cigarette burns for 12 minutes and pollutes the air continuously ....-20 Both smokers and nonsmokers inhale this unfiltered smoke. "Inhalation of atmospheric pollutants from the smoke of tobacco products is referred to as passive
(involuntary, secondhand) smoking." 211

14. SMOKING DIGEST, supra note 5, at 17.
15 Epstein, The Effects of Tobacco Smoke Pollution on the Eyes of the Allergic
Non-Smoker, 2 SMOKING AND HEALTH, 337, 338 (1975).
16. Tate, The Effects of Tobacco Smoke on the Non-Smoking Cardio-Pulmonary Public, 2 SMOKING AND HEALTH 329, 332 (1975).
17. 1979 REPORT, supra note 3, at 11-5.

18. Tate, supra note 16, at 332. See 1983 REPORT,supra note 1, at 211, for a
chart comparing toxic levels of sidestream and mainstream smoke.
Arguably the major cause of harm to the smoker is sidestream smoke. Studies
conclude that smoking is harmful, but the apportionment of that harm between mainstream smoke and sidestream smoke is not known. Perhaps if smokers could inhale only
the filtered mainstream smoke, the harm would not be as great. Smokers, however, are
unavoidably exposed to high concentrations of sidestream smoke from the burning ends
of cigarettes.
19.

Epstein, supra note 15, at 338.

20. Id.
21.

Lefcoe, Ashley, Pederson & Keays, The Health Risks of Passive Smoking:
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Known and Suspected Risks of Passive Smoking

Cancer is widely believed to be the primary risk of tobacco smoke.
Probably nothing is further from the truth. Although cancer is a
known, serious risk of tobacco smoke, a multitude of other harms exist
which are more common, and some are just as deadly. Research is unfolding the sad news that these harms are adversely affecting the nonsmoker as well as the smoker. Considering the physical nature of tobacco smoke described, one should not be surprised. In heavily smokefilled rooms "in a relatively short time a non-smoker can inhale the
equivalent of 5-6 cigarettes. 22
1. Carbon Monoxide Poisoning
One known risk to the nonsmoker from passive smoking is his exposure to higher levels of carbon monoxide. Carbon monoxide averages
"5 volumes percent in mainstream and 10 to 15 volumes percent by
weight in side-stream smoke. ' 23 "Safe limits for levels in working areas
have been set at 8.7 ppm [parts per million] for 8 hours, or 35 ppm for
1 hour. .. - Yet the "concentration in inhaled tobacco smoke is 400
ppm." '25 Enclosed areas with heavy smoke concentrations often reach
levels of 50 ppm to 100 ppm. 26 A nonsmoker who works five eight-hour
days in a room with smokers cannot avoid inhaling a great amount of
tobacco smoke, and thus high levels of carbon monoxide. Inhaling carbon monoxide raises the level of venous-blood carboxyhemoglobin
(COHb) in the blood.27 The normal level of COHb in nonsmokers is
The Growing Case for Control Measures in Enclosed Environments, 84 CHEST 90
(July 1, 1983).
22. Tate, supra note 16, at 332.
23. Lefcoe, supra note 21, at 90.
Carbon monoxide is a common industrial pollutant generated by
any burning process. It is odorless and tasteless and gives no warning of its presence in most circumstances, thus allowing for chronic
exposure over extended periods of time. The early symptoms of carbon monoxide poisoning often resemble those of a variety of diseases; thus tissue hypoxia might occur in healthy persons without
forewarning. ...
1983 REPORT, supra note 1, at 244 (footnote ommitted).
24. Tate, supra note 16, at 331.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See 1979 REPORT, supra note 3, at 11-15-24; SMOKING DIGEST, supra note
5, at 17. "Atherosclerosis is a multifactorial disorder in which cigarette smoking and
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between .5% and 2.0%.28 Smokers' normal levels range between 2.0%
and 15% depending on the average number of cigarettes smoked.29
These levels change when passive smoking begins. One study
placed nine smokers and twelve nonsmokers in a room. The subjects
remained in the room for about one hour, and during that time the
ambient carbon monoxide concentration from the smokers' tobacco
smoke reached 38 ppm.30 "The mean COHb of the twelve non-smokers
increased from 1.6% to 2.6%, while the six cigarette smokers
crease[d] from a mean of 5.9% to 9.6 %."1

. . .

in-

The effect of even low levels of COHb can be very hazardous to
one's health. 32 Because of the lack of oxygen that results from higher
levels of COHb, everyone may be more susceptible to cardiovascular
disease. This threat is even greater for individuals with a pre-existing
cardiovascular problem. 33 One study of ten angina patients exposed to
the sidestream smoke of only fifteen cigarettes over two hours in a wellventilated room still showed an increase in "resting heart rate, systolic
and diastolic blood pressure, and venous carboxyhemoglobin and decreased their heart rate and systolic blood pressure at angina."" "The
duration of exercise until angina was decreased 22 percent. .

. ."35

Of

course, even larger increases and decreases occurred in an unventilated
room with a 38% decrease in the exercise duration.3 6 The study concluded that "[p]assive smoking aggravates angina pectoris. ' 3
Tobacco smoke may be a direct cause of many auto accidents.38
Evidence shows that reaction time and other sensory abilities necessary
carboxyhemoglobin levels may exert varying effects, depending upon the other risk factors present. Carbon monoxide is believed to be a contributing factor to the acceleration of the disease process." 1983 REPORT, supra note 1, at 225.
28. SMOKING DIGEST, supra note 5, at 17.

29. Id.
30. Russell, Cole & Brown, Absorption by Non-Smokers of Carbon Monoxide
from Room Air Polluted by Tobacco Smoke, 1 THE LANCET 576 (1973).
31. Id.
32. See 1979 REPORT, supra note 3, at 11-29; 1983 REPORT supra note 1, at
221-26.
33. 1979 REPORT, supra note 3, at 11-29.
34.
MED. 21

35.
36.
37.
38.

Aronow, Effect of Passive Smoking on Angina Pectoris, 299 NEw ENG. J.
(1978).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See 1979 REPORT, supra note 3, at 11-28-29; Tate, supra note 16, at 331.
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for driving are impaired when COHb levels reach 2.0% to 3.0%.39 Considering the carbon monoxide levels several smokers in a car can create,
one may reasonably hypothesize that even a nonsmoking driver's
COHb level may reach well above 2.0%.
In addition, doctors at the University of South Florida College of
Medicine observed acute Raynaud's phenomenon 40 in both the former
and current nonsmoking wives of a heavy smoker.4 1 The first wife's
symptoms disappeared after divorce; the second wife's symptoms subsided after the husband began smoking in a separate room. 2
2. Respiratory Disease
Many of the toxic substances permeating the air in tobacco smoke
are known to be damaging to the lungs. Hydrogen cyanide, for example, is a poison which destroys cells of the lining of the respiratory systems.43 It is believed that exposure to only 10 ppm of hydrogen cyanide
over a long period causes this damage, and tobacco smoke may contain
as much as 1600 ppm.44 Nitrogen dioxide (250 ppm in tobacco smoke)
is linked to emphysema.' 5 Cadmium, another toxic substance found in
tobacco smoke, possibly "damages the air sacs in the lungs and causes
emphysema. Once cadmium gets into the lungs it remains there. ' 46
A study correlated a relationship between damage to the small airways in the lungs and passive smoking of nonsmokers .' The researchers examined 2,100 subjects and found that "nonsmokers chronically
exposed to tobbacco smoke had a lower forced mid-expiratory flow
rate. . .than nonsmokers not exposed. . .. -4'The study "conclude[s]
39. 1979 REPORT, supra note 3, at 11-28; 1972 REPORT, supra note 6 at 127;
Russell, supra note 30, at 579.

40. "Raynaud's phenomenon is described as intermittent attacks of pallor and
cyanosis of the hand and fingers due to spasmodically diminished blood flow and eventually reddening during the recovery stage." GRAY, 3b ATTORNEYS' TEXTBOOK OF
MEDICINE (MB) 1 100.70 (1983).
41.
Boganegra & Espinoza, Raynaud's Phenomenon In Passive Smokers, 303
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1419 (1980) (letter to editor).
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Tate, supra note 16, at 332; SMOKING DIGEST, supra note 5, at 18.
Tate, supra note 16, at 332.

45.

Id.

46. Epstein, supra note 15, at 338.
47. White & Froeb, Small-Airways Dysfunction in Nonsmokers Chronically
Exposed to Tobacco Smoke, 302 NEw ENG. J. MED. 720 (1980).

48.

Id.
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that chronic exposure to tobacco smoke in the work environment is deleterious to the nonsmoker and significantly reduces small-airways
function. 49
3.

Cancer

Studies of nonsmoking women, some married to smokers and
others married to nonsmokers, suggest a real risk of cancer from passive smoking.50 One prospective fourteen-year study found that nonsmoking wives of husbands who smoked less than one pack a day had
one and one half times the risk of lung cancer than nonsmoking wives
of nonsmoking husbands.51 When the husbands smoked more than one
pack per day, the risk was twice as great. 52 A subsequent similar study
"[e]stimates. . .the relative risk. . . associated with having a husband
who smokes were 2.4 for a smoker of less than one pack and 3.4
for. . 3.husbands smok[ing] more than one pack of cigarettes per
5
day."
4.

General Illness

In addition to the effects mentioned, evidence suggests tobacco
smoke exposure "significantly lower[s] the level of antibody production
to influenza virus A2 . . ."," suppresses the lymphocytes function in

the immune process, 55 and "affects the body's ability to utilize Vitamin
C."' 56 The obvious result is an increased risk of common illness. Indeed,
a 1965 study "estimate[s].

.

.that smoking-related illness or disease

each year costs the United States 77 million workdays lost, 88 million
days spent ill in bed, and 306 million days of restricted activity. '5 Another estimate suggests "that more than 10% of all hospital and medi49. Id.
50. See Lefcoe, supra note 21, at 92; Repace, The Problem of Passive Smoking 2
(1981) (unpublished paper presented at the Symposium on Health Aspects of Indoor
Air Pollution, The New York Academy of Medicine, May 28-29, 1981).
51. Repace, supra note 50, at 23 (citing Hirayame, Nonsmoking Wives of Heavy
Smokers Have a Higher Risk of Lung Cancer: A Study from Japan, 282 BRITISH
MED. J. 183 (1981)).
52. Repace, supra note 50, at 2.
53. Trichopoulos, Lung Cancer and Passive Smoking, 27 INT. J. CANCER 1
(1981).
54. See Tate, supra note 16, at 333.

55. Id.
56. SMOKING
57.

DIGEST,

supra note 5, at 22.

Id. at 23.
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cal expenses in the United States are tobacco-related. This raises the
overall cost of health insurance and taxpayer-supported health programs." 8 Logic suggests that long-term passive smoking at home or at
work not only reduces a nonsmoker's ability to stay healthy, but also
costs him money.
5.

Allergies

Tobacco smoke is extremely aggravating to those who suffer from
allergies, and many of these people may not be aware that tobacco
smoke is the source of their aggravation.5 9 "The American Medical Association estimates that at least 34 million Americans are sensitive in
one way or another to cigarette smoke." 60 For these people, passive
smoking "can precipitate acute attacks of asthma requiring an
emergency fisit to a physician's office or hospital emergency
room ..

."I" "Tobacco smoke from any source is like salt rubbed into

a raw sore." 62 Certainly thirty-four million Americans is a large
enough minority to receive protection.
6.

Special Hazards to Children

Although an adult has a choice whether to live in a home fraught
with tobacco smoke, the fetus, infant and minor child do not. Children
respirate more than adults, and therefore, inhale more secondary
smoke. 63 Young children of smoking parents also probably spend more
time in smoke-filled environments than nonsmoking adults who have a
choice. "It has already been conclusively proven that in homes where
smoking occurs, children are seriously affected. '6 4
Some of the research concludes as follows: Children who grow up
in households with at least one heavy smoker have 46% more restricted
days and 43% more bedridden days than children who grow up in
smoke-free homes.6 5 "Babies born to women who smoke during pregnancy are, on the average, 200 grams lighter than babies born to com58. Id.
59. See Tate, supra note 16, at 329-30.
60. Epstein, supra note 15, at 337.
61. Tate, supra note 16, at 329.
62. Id. at 330.
63. 1979 REPORT, supra note 3, at 11-31.
64. Tate, supra note 16, at 334.
65. Repace, supra note 50, at 4 (citing Bonham & Wilson, Children'sHealth in
Families with CigaretteSmokers, 71 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 290 (1981)).
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parable women who do not smoke."66 "The infants of mothers who
smoke [have]. . .significantly more [hospital] admissions for bronchitis
or pneumonia ....*"67 Mothers who smoke have a higher "risk of having stillborn children.

.

., and their infants have higher neonatal death

rates."6 8

Research suggests that fetuses and children who do survive
are damaged by the lower levels of Vitamin C. 9
Even more distressing is the evidence that passive smoking by children has long-term, permanent effects.70 For example, smokers' children show "measurable deficiencies in physical growth, intellectual and
emotional development, and behavior. '7 1 "Children whose mothers
smoked 10 or more cigarettes a day during pregnancy were on the average 1.0 centimeter shorter [ages 7 and 11 years] and 3 to 5 months
retarded in reading, mathematics, and general ability as compared with
the offspring of nonsmokers. 7 2
More studies of the ill effects of passive smoking on children exist.
Typical is the latest suggestion "that passive exposure to maternal cigarette smoke may have important effects on the development of pulmonary function in children. 73 The study states:
The data. .

.,

which suggest that after five years, the lungs of non-

smoking children with mothers who smoke grow at only 93 per cent
of the rate of growth in nonsmoking children with mothers who do
not smoke, are certainly plausible in terms of the magnitude of the
effect that one might predict for an environmental pollutant such
as cigarette smoke. The size of the effect is consistent with that
hypothesized to be sufficient as an underlying risk predictor for obstructive airways disease in adult life. 4

66. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERvicES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING FOR WOMEN 191 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 REPORT].
67. Harlap & Davies, Infant Admissions to Hospital and Maternal Smoking, I
THE LANCET 529 (1974).
68. Smoking Digest, supra note 5, at 26; See also 1980 REPORT, supra note 66,
at 191.
69. SMOKING DIGEST, supra note 5, at 26.
70. 1980 REPORT, supra note 65, at 196-225.

71.
72.

Id. at 196.
Id. at 199.

73.

Tager, Weiss, Munoz, Rosner & Speizer, Longitudinal Study of the Effects

of Maternal Smoking on Pulmonary Function in Children,, 309 NEW
699 (1983).
74. Id. at 702.
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Recent evidence reveals that significant levels of thiocyanate
(SCN), a biproduct of tobacco smoke, appear in the fetuses of nonsmoking mothers who are exposed to passive smoking.75 A logical conclusion is that even mothers who have quit smoking or have never
smoked subject their unborn to these harms if they live or work in
smoke-filled environments.
Most studies demonstrate that although the risks of harm from
tobacco smoke are still greater to the smoker, risks to the nonsmoker
are real and significant. As concluded in a recent cardiopulmonary
journal, "[tihere is still much research to be done into the health effects of passive moking; however, the need for such research should
not be used as an excuse of inaction. '7 At the very least, the present
scientific evidence supports an overwhelming likelihood that passive
smoking causes a substantial and irreparable harm to nonsmokers. This
familiar legal standard of harm7 7 has created legal conflicts between
smokers and nonsmokers.
III.
A.

Nonsmokers' Attempts to Gain Judicial Relief

Federal Courts Decline to Recognize Fundamental Right

Despite the medical evidence, nonsmokers have been unsuccessful
in establishing rights based on the United States Constitution. For example, the nonsmoking plaintiffs in Gasparv. Lousisiana Stadium and
Exposition District 8 sought a smoking ban in the Louisiana
Superdome. Plaintiffs asserted that secondary tobacco smoke causes
physical harm and discomfort; interferes with the enjoyment of events;
and, therefore, violates the rights guaranteed under the first, fifth,
ninth and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution.7 9 Essentially,
Gaspar nonsmokers attempted to shade themselves under the penum75. Bottoms, Kuhnert, Kuhnert & Reese, Maternal Passive Smoking and Fetal
Serum Thiocyanate Levels, 144 Am. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 787 (1982).
76. Lefcoe, supra note 21, at 94.
77. Nonsmokers usually seek an injunction as a remedy to prevent the use of
tobacco products. To receive an injunction in Florida, as in most jurisdictions, one must
demonstrate a reasonable probability of irreparable harm. Davis v. Wilson, 139 Fla.
698 700, 190 So. 716, 719 (1939); Paul's Drugs Inc. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
175 So. 2d 203, 206 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
78. 418 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. La. 1976), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979).
79. Id. at 717.
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bral privacy rights first surfacing in Griswoldv. State of Connecticut.80
Declining to extend that right to the tobacco smoking controversy, the
district court stated: "To hold that the First, Fifth, Ninth or Fourteenth Amendments recognize as fundamental the right to be free from
cigaret smoke would be to mock the lofty purposes of such amendments
and broaden their penumbral protections to unheard-of boundaries. "81
A group of nonsmoking federal employees attempting to have
smoking in federal buildings restricted to designated areas met with
rejection of their constitutional argument in Federal Employees for
Nonsmokers' Rights (FENSR) v. United States."2 FENSR plaintiffs
alleged two constitutional violations: 1) by failing to provide a safe,
smoke-free environment the government has impaired plaintiffs' first
amendment right to petition and receive redress for their grievances,83
and 2) through the same failure, the government has "discriminated
against them and denied them their life, liberty and property without
due process of law in violation of the fifth amendment." 4 Relying on
and quoting extensively from Gaspar, the FENSR district court
granted the government's motion to dismiss the constitutional claims. 85
In part, the FENSR and Gaspar courts based their conclusions on previous decisions holding that no claim to any clean environment is constitutionally grounded. 86
Unfortunately, both opinions express some of the common misconceptions clouding the issue. For example, Gasparrelies on and FENSR
repeats the hackneyed comparison between alcohol and cigarettes suggesting that the allowance of smoking is no different than the allowance of drinking beer, and, therefore, no more a violation of constitutional rights."' However, the comparison of an individual's right to
drink alcohol in public and his right to smoke tobacco does not address
80. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). Justice Douglas' analysis of penumbral rights in
Griswold opened the door for the fundamental right to privacy litigation. See Gaspar,
418 F. Supp. at 721.
81. Gaspar, 418 F. Supp. at 721.
82. 446 F. Supp. 181 (D.D.C. 1978), a.f'd, 598 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979).
83. Id. at 183-84.
84. Id. at 184.
85. Id. at 184-85.
86. Id. at 184 (relying on Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1971));
Gaspar, 418 F. Supp. at 720 (relying on Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp.
532, 536-37 (S.D. Tex. 1972)).
87. Gaspar, 418 F. Supp. at 718; FENSR, 446 F. Supp. at 184.
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the essential complaint of nonsmokers. The distinction is simple and
basic. When an individual exercises his right to drink alcohol, any ill
effects directly caused by the dangers of alcohol are hazardous only to
that individual. The risks that individual takes are self-contained. The
same is not true with tobacco. When an individual exercises the decision to smoke tobacco he inescapably subjects other individuals who
breathe the air in his vicinity to the hazards of tobacco smoke. His
choice to injure himself entails a concomitant injury to others. The issue is not whether an individual has the right to subject himself to the
known hazard; the issue is whether in the process of doing so he has the
right to subject others to the same known hazard. An individual may
legally drink alcohol only to the degree he does not harm others. To
apply the analogue of this principle is the goal of nonsmokers. Any
comparison of smoking to other social activities which do not contain
this necessary similarity is misleading. 8
Whether Gaspar and FENSR have closed the door on nonsmokers' chances of prevailing on a constitutional basis is not certain.
Any future recognition of a constitutional right to be free from cigarette smoke will depend on more than relevant comparisons. Nonsmokers must surmount the initial problem of establishing smoking as a
form of "state action" since constitutional protections against a private
interference do not exist.89 Perhaps the taxing of tobacco products
makes public smoking an act authorized by the government.90 Assum88. UCLA Associate Dean, economist and Tobacco Institute consultant, Lewis
Solmon, was recently quoted as saying: .'It scares me if a president of a company
implements a [no smoking] policy that takes away your individual rights
[;]... [w]hat's next, limiting the consumption of red meat in the company cafeteria?"'
Brophy, A Burning Issue: Smokers Say It's Their Right as More Employers Snuff It
Out, USA Today, Jan. 13, 1984, at 3B, col. 3. This typical, misleading statement fails
to recognize that no matter how close one sits to an individual who chooses to eat red
meat, any potential hazard from its consumption will not harm the bystander who
chooses not to eat red meat.
89. See generally Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721-22
(1961) (fourteenth amendment inhibits only state actions, not individual actions). Gaspar raised the issue of state action but declined to address it since the court found that
there would be no constitutional violation in any event. 418 F. Supp. at 717, 722. In
FENSR, state action was not an issue.
90. See Sapolsky, The Political Obstacles to the Control of CigaretteSmoking
in the United States, 5 J. HEALTH POLITICS, POLICY AND LAw 277 (1980). The federal
government receives over two billion dollars a year in excise taxes alone from cigarette
sales. Id. at 285. In Burton, a private restaurant operator's practice of racial discrimination was found to be state action because public funds supported the building and
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ing state action was judicially acknowledged, nonsmokers would then
have to convince the courts to re-evaluate present-day scientific and
medical evidence and find the harm great enough to warrant placing
nonsmokers' interests within the penumbral protections of the Constitution. Although Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,91
demonstrates the Supreme Court's willingness to adapt prior decisions
to fit "present medical knowledge," 9 2 the Court has been unwilling to
extend the penumbral fundamental rights concept beyond the areas of
family relationships and abortions. Smoking falls into neither category;
consequently, it is unlikely that recognition of a constitutional right to
be free of involuntary smoking will be forthcoming.
B.

Footholds Gained in State Court Actions

1.

Common-law Theories Lead to Success for Workers

Although no constitutional right to a smoke-free environment presently exists, some nonsmokers have achieved a smoke-free workplace
through the common law applied in their state courts. The syllogism is
simple: All employers have a common-law duty to provide employees
with a safe place to work. Tobacco smoke in the workplace creates an
unsafe condition. Therefore, an employer must provide employees with
a smoke-free workplace.
Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co.93 is the landmark case
which established this syllogism. Through standard grievance procedures, Donna Shimp, a secretary for the telephone company, had complained of tobacco smoke in her work area. In response, her employer
grounds he leased. 365 U.S. 715. A number of years later, however, the Supreme Court
held that a state's granting of a liquor license to a private club was insufficient to make
that club's discrimination practices a state action. Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163
(1972). Subsequent decisions signal a retreat from the liberal interpretation of state
action in Burton, suggesting that failure to enact and enforce smoking regulations in
private facilities would not be found to be state action giving nonsmokers a remedy
under the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830
(1982) (private school's fiscal dependence on government insufficient to make discharge
of teachers a state action).
91. - U.S.
, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983). Because of new and safer procedures,
Akron expanded a woman's right to receive an abortion at an outpatient facility during
the second trimester even though the state's interest in the fetus at that time is "compelling." Id. at
103 S. Ct. at 2495.
92. Id. at
103 S. Ct. at 2496.
93. 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
-'

-'
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installed an exhaust fan, but for various reasons the remedy failed."'
Unhappy and ill from involuntarily breathing her co-workers' secondary smoke, Ms. Shimp brought suit against the telephone company.
She alleged that the company's permitting employees to smoke at their
workstations created an unsafe condition, "deleterious to her health,"95
and that the company, therefore, breached its common-law duty to provide her a safe place to work. 96
After recognizing an employer's "affirmative duty to provide a
work area that is free from unsafe conditions," 97 the Shimp court took
"judicial notice of the toxic nature of cigarette smoke and its wellknown association with emphysema, lung cancer and heart disease.""
Relying on the various Surgeon General's reports, and the affidavits of
various experts,"9 the court further stated that "mere presence of cigarette smoke in the air pollutes it, changing carbon monoxide levels and
effectively making involuntary smokers of all who breathe the air."100
"[It] also. . .adds tar, nicotine and the oxides of nitrogen to the available air supply." ' The court concluded:
The evidence is clear and overwhelming. Cigarette smoke contaminates and pollutes the air, creating a health hazard not merely to
the smoker but to all those around her who must rely upon the
same air supply. The right of an individual to risk his or her own
health does not include the right to jeopardize the health of those
who must remain around102him or her in order to properly perform
the duties of their jobs.
The first progeny of the Shimp decision is a Missouri case, Smith
v. Western Electric Co."'3 At the time of suit, Paul Smith had been
employed by Western Electric for more than thirty years. Since 1975,
however, Mr. Smith had suffered severe physical reactions when exposed to secondary tobacco smoke. After various complaints and several unsuccessful attempts to alleviate the conditions, Smith's employer
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 521, 368 A.2d at 410.
Id. at 520, 368 A.2d at 410.
Id. at 521, 368 A.2d at 410.
Id.
Id. at 527, 368 A.2d at 414.
Id. at 528, 368 A.2d at 414.
Id. at 527, 368 A.2d at 414.
Id. at 528, 368 A.2d at 414.
Id. at 530-31, 368 A.2d at 415.
643 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
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instructed him not to submit any more complaints, for none would be
processed.104 Rather than prohibiting smoking in the work area, Western Electric responded by offering Smith the alternative of wearing a
respirator or transferring to the computer room at a $500 per month
pay cut.10 5 Unimpressed with the alternatives, Smith filed suit to enjoin
Western Electric from breaking its common-law "duty to provide a
safe place in which to work." 10 6 The trial court granted Western Electric's motion to dismiss for failure "to state a claim upon which relief
' 1 07
can be granted."
After recognizing Missouri's acceptance of the employer's duty
and reciting the Shimp syllogism,108 the court of appeals focused on
whether an injunction is an appropriate remedy for breach of that
duty. 109 The standard for determining the appropriateness of injunctive
relief is whether "irreparable harm is otherwise likely to result. . .and
[the] plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law."1 10 The Smith court
held that one may reasonably infer that cigarette smoke is causing the
plaintiff irreparable harm, and when a harm's full effect takes many
years to be realized, money damages are inadequate compensation. 1
The plaintiff had stated a cause of action, and his case was remanded
for determination on the merits.
In California, Hentzel v. Singer Co." 2 extended the possible
causes of action for smoking in the workplace beyond the employer's
common-law duty. Paul Hentzel, a former attorney for the Singer
Company, alleged he had been fired because of his repeated complaints
and demands for a smoke-free workplace."1 3 Although he relied tangentially upon Shimp,114 Hentzel based his case on wrongful termination,
breach of contract, and, most interestingly, on intentional infliction of
104.
105.

Id. at 12.
Id. Ironically, Western Electric offered Smith the computer room position

because smoke is harmful to computers and, therefore, banned only in the computer

ioom. Id.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 12, 13.
Id. at 13.
Id. (citations omitted).

111.

Id.

112.
113.
114.

138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
Id. at 294, 188 Cal Rptr. at 160.
Id. at 296 n.2, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 162 n.2.
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emotional distress.115
On the count of intentional infliction of emotional distress, Hentzel
alleged that his employer, knowing of Hentzel's desire for a reasonably
smoke-free environment, . . .place[d] him in a working area with a

heavier concentration of smoke. . .failed to segregate conference rooms
into smoking and non-smoking areas, and failed to prevent other employees from 'directly antagonizing, him in various ways. . . ."I" The

trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the California
Workers Compensation Act preempted the cause. 117 However, the
court of appeals reversed, stating that intentional infliction of emotional
distress was neither contemplated by, nor included in, the workers'
compensation law."" As long as the recovery sought is beyond the
scope of compensation covered by workers' compensation law, a suit
may be maintained. Therefore, Hentzel's complaint had stated a cause
of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 119
Of course, not every complaining nonsmoker has achieved success.
20
The recent case of Gordon v. Raven Systems and Research, Inc.3
from the District of Columbia is the Shimp antithesis. Like the plaintiffs in Shimp, Smith, and Hentzel, Adel Gordon informed her employer of her sensitivity to tobacco smoke and her desire to be free
from such smoke during working hours. Her employer's attempts to
accommodate her fell short of preventing smoking in the workplace
and, therefore, failed to assuage Ms. Gordon.12 ' Because Ms. Gordon
refused to return to her assigned workgroup, continuing instead to work
in a secluded area, her employer fired her for insubordination.1 2 Ms.
Gordon brought suit for wrongful termination and breach of an em23
ployer's duty to provide a safe place to work1
The court's reasoning in Gordon is widely disparate from that in
Shimp. The Gordon court began with the same major premise of the
employer's duty to provide a safe workplace, but added that this duty
does not require an employer "to adapt his workplace to the particular
115.

Id. at 294, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 160.

116. Id. at 294, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
117. Id. at 306, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 462 A.2d 10 (D.C. 1983).
121. Id. at 11, 12.
122. Id. at 12.
123. Id. at 11.
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."I" The court of appeals

affirmed the trial court's directed verdict in favor of defendant Raven
Systems by stating, "[w]ithout such duty, appellant can complain of no
wrong. 125 Of course, the implied minor premise of the Gordon syllogism appears to be that
tobacco smoke is unsafe only to those with
1 26
particular sensitivities.
The Gordon opinion does not completely ignore Shimp. The court
acknowledged that Shimp had taken judicial notice of the hazards of
tobacco smoke to everyone, based on expert testimony and scientific
studies. 127 Nevertheless, the Gordon court distinguished its facts from
Shimp because the plaintiff Gordon had not produced her own medical
evidence of the dangers of tobacco smoke, and because she had pleaded
only that the duty was owed to her due to her particular sensitivities. 12
It seems anomalous that the court would deny Gordon relief because
tobacco smoke affected her even more adversely than the average person. Perhaps the court would have granted relief had her injury been
less dramatic.
Whether the court would have granted Ms. Gordon relief even had
she offered scientific and medical evidence that tobacco smoke harms
everyone is doubtful. Because she failed to plead these general claims,
the court stated, "we need not pass on [Shimp's]. . .suitability as substantive law."' 29 This language may be a subtle indication of an unwillingness to have found Shimp persuasive had the court felt compelled to
analyze its substance.
An even stronger indication of Ms. Gordon's doubtful chances for
success is the court's dictum prefacing its discussion. The court first
noted: "The issue of nonsmokers' rights is a relatively new one in
American jurisprudence."' 130 The court cited Gaspar and other cases
denying nonsmokers a constitutional right, and then stated that "the
issue of nonsmokers' rights is one better left to the legislature[;]...
appellant encourages us to act where the legislature has not, [and] [w] e
124. Id. at 14 (emphasis added). Gordon ignores that 34 million Americans are
hypersensitive to tobacco smoke. See supra text accompanying note 59-62.
125. Id. at 15.
126. But see supra text accompanying notes 11-77 (tobacco smoke pollution is
harmful to everyone).
127. Gordon, 462 A.2d at 15.
128. Id,
129. Id.
130. Id. at 14.
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"131

The Gordon decision is troubling for several reasons. The fact that
a legislature has not acted on an issue well suited for it is irrelevant
when a common-law remedy already exists. Furthermore, even when a
legislature does act, the statutory remedy in these situations is usually
cumulative to the common-law remedy unless the statute clearly indicates otherwise. 132 Leaving aside its very narrow reading of the plaintiff's complaint, Gordon seems to suggest that an existing common-law
right can be destroyed by legislative inaction. Certainly the court would
not intentionally advocate such a doctrine without support.
2.

OSHA: Support without Remedy

Contrary to the Gordon court's belief in legislative inaction, an
argument exists that Congress has codified the common-law duty by
3
enacting the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA). 1
Pursuant to its power to control interstate commerce, Congress recognized that "illnesses arising out of work situations impose a substantial
burden upon, and.

.

. [are] a hindrance to, interstate commerce. ' ' xs

The purpose of OSHA is "to assure so far as possible.
healthful working conditions ..

.

.safe and

."I" The Act defines "occupational

safety and health standard" as a condition requiring the adoption of
"practices, means, methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places
of employment." 36 This Act, which applies to a wide array of workplaces, provides in section 654(a)(1) that "[e]ach employer shall furnish. . .his employees. . .a place. . .free from recognized hazards that
are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical
harm. .

"137

In determining what constitutes a "recognized hazard" under section 654(a)(1), courts have looked at many factors, including condi131.

Id.

132.

E.g., Isbrindtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779 (1952). "Statutes which in-

vade the common law. . . are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of
long-established and familiar principles except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident." Id. at 783.

133. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
134. Id. § 651(a).
135. Id. § 651(b).
136. Id. § 652(8) (emphasis added).
137. Id. § 651(a)(1).
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tions detectable by human senses or through the aid of instrumentation,
and employers' constructive knowledge." 1381 American Smelting and
Refining Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n" 9
holds that section 654(a)(1) encompasses "a health standard recognized nationally for many years. ' '1 4 0 American Smelting, similar to the

nonsmoking cases, involved levels of lead in the air which were higher
than the nationally-recognized safe level. The court found these levels

to be within the meaning of "recognized hazard" even though the levels
could be detected only through measuring air quality, not through
1 41

sense detection.
Most offices and workplaces which permit smoking probably contain toxic air levels many times higher than any safe standard, 42 but
the Secretary of Labor has not, as yet, promulgated any standard for

tobacco smoke.' 43 Considering the scientific and medical evidence, the
Secretary could reasonably conclude: 1) that the absence of cigarette
smoke in the workplace would reduce illness, thus easing the burden on
interstate commerce; 2) that this absence could be achieved by adopting reasonable bans on smoking; and 3) that the result would free employees from a recognized hazard.

Although FENSR, Shimp, Smith, and Hentzel all discussed
OSHA,14 1 none could be decided based on OSHA since it is well established that OSHA does not provide a private cause of action. 145 However, in construing the California OSHA, modeled after the federal
Act, Hentzel held that OSHA is cumulative rather than exclusive of

138. See, e.g., Usery v. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co., 568 F.2d 902 (2d Cir.
1977) (hazardous condition detectable through observation and common sense); American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 501
F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1974) (hazardous condition detectable only through instrumentation); Otis Elevator Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 581 F.2d
1056 (2d Cir. 1978) (hazardous condition satisfied if employer should have known).
139. 501 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1974).
140. Id. at 512.
141. Id. at 510-11.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 23-29.
143. 28 U.S.C. § 655 (1976) authorizes the Secretary of Labor to set standards
based upon a national consensus. But see Smith, 643 S.W.2d at 14 (no standard has
been set).
144. FENSR, 446 F. Supp. at 183; Shimp, 145 N.J. Super. at 522, 368 A.2d at
410; Smith 643 S.W.2d at 14; Hentzel, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 300-301, 188 Cal. Rptr. at
166.
145. See Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1980).
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the common law.14 6 Indeed, section 653(4) of the federal OSHA makes
very clear that OSHA shall neither "supersede . . . [n]or affect. . .the
common law . .14

The Occupational Health and Safety Act itself, even without a
private right of action, is persuasive evidence that Congress accepted
the major premise on which the nonsmoking plaintiffs have relied.
Therefore, the legislative action the Gordon court sought for authority
to grant relief may exist in OSHA, demonstrating Congress' desire to
provide everyone a safe place to work.
3.

Relief for the Hypersensitive Nonsmoker

Other nonsmokers who suffer from extreme physical reactions to
secondary tobacco smoke have sought relief as handicapped or disabled
persons. For example, in Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 148 the plaintiff
Vickers, very sensitive to tobacco smoke, worked in a crowded room
with several heavy smokers. 14 9 Vickers alleged that his sensitivity to
tobacco smoke qualified him as a handicapped person under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,150 and the district court agreed with this classification. 15 1 Vickers further alleged that his superiors' animosity toward
him and Veterans Administration's failure to provide him a smoke-free
workplace constituted discrimination against a handicapped in violation
of 29 U.S.C. § 794.152 The district court disagreed, stating that evidence showed Vickers received promotions, work assignments, and incentives as any other employee, 153 and that Vickers "failed to cite any
authority from the decided cases to the effect that the Veterans Administration was under a duty to make 'reasonable accommodations" to
plaintiffs' sensitivity to tobacco smoke. ' 154 This language resembles the
Gordon court language, but can be distinguished since the duty under
146.
147.

138 Cal. App. 3d at 301, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 166.
28 U.S.C. § 653(4); See also Shimp, 145 N.J. Super. at 522, 368 A.2d at

410.
148. 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
149. Id. at 88-89.
150. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
151. 549 F. Supp. at 86-87 (relying on language of 29 U.S.C. § 707(7)(B)); but
cf.GASP v. Mecklenburg County, 42 N.C. App. 225, 256 S.E.2d 477 (N.C. Ct. App.
1979) (nonsmokers are not handicapped).
152. Vickers, 549 F. Supp. at 87 (29 U.S.C. § 794 prevents discrimination
against those qualifying under the Act as handicapped persons).
153. Vickers, 549 F. Supp. at 87.
154. Id.
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inquiry is the duty to the handicapped, not the duty to all employees to

provide a safe work place. The Vickers court deliberately states: "This
is not an action to determine whether all government employees have a

right to work in offices which are free from tobacco smoke. It is an
action solely to determine whether this one plaintiff has the right to
'
work in an environment wholly free from tobacco smoke." 155
In Parodi v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd.,' 56 another hypersensitive

nonsmoker sought disability retirement benefits. Under the applicable
law at that time "a person [was] totally disabled if unable to perform
'useful and efficient service in grade or class of position last occupied. . .because of. . .injury not due to vicious habits, intemperance,
or willful misconduct on his part within five years before becoming disBoth the Office of Personnel Management and the Merit
abled.' ,,'15
Systems Protection Board determined Parodi was not disabled. The
Ninth Circuit, however, reversed both administrations' determinations 158 stating Parodi is disabled because "[s]he cannot perform her
job, not due to choice or bad habits .. -159 The court remanded the
case to determine whether a smoke-free work environment is available
for her 160
Several courts have denied nonsmokers' requests for unemployment compensation after the nonsmokers quit work, refusing to work in
smoke-filled environments.' 6 ' In Alexander v. Unemployment Ins. Ap155. Id. at 86 (emphasis original).
156. 690 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1982).
157. Id. at 737 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 8331(6), which was subsequently replaced
with new language in Act of Dec. 5, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, Title IV, § 403(b), 94
Stat. 2606 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 8337(a) 1981)).
158. 690 F.2d at 732-33.
159. Id. at 738.
160. Id. at 740.
161. See Rotenburg v. Industrial Comm'n., 42 Colo. App. 161, 590 P.2d 521
(Colo. Ct. App. 1979); Beecham v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 150 Neb. 792, 36 N.W.2d
233 (1949); Ruckstuhl v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 57 Pa. Commw. 302, 426 A.2d 719 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981). These cases do not
preclude compensation as a matter of law, thereby leaving open the possibility of future
success. For example, the Ruckstuhl court stated:
Although it is now generally accepted that cigarette smoke may be
harmful to smokers and non-smokers alike, we cannot presume for unemployment compensation purposes that anyone exposed to cigarette smoke
in one's work environment is so physically harmed that a voluntary termination of employment will be automatically justified and unemployment
benefits granted. Thus, we must treat this case as any other that involves a
voluntary termination for health reasons.
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peals Bd.,16 2 a nonsmoking X-ray technologist quit work because her
employer failed to enforce its policy against smoking. 63 The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's mandate to pay her unemployment
compensation.1 6 4 The court stated that a nonsmoker "has good cause
for rejecting work where cigarette smoke is present because such work
is not 'suitable
employment' since it would be injurious to her
16 5
health."
Although Vickers, Parodi,and Alexander provide encouragement
for the hypersensitive nonsmoker, these cases did not ban or limit
smoking in the workplace. None addressed the Shimp issue of the employer's common-law duty to all employees.
4.

Florida Common Law Supports Judicial Activism

Although no nonsmoking employee cases have yet been reported,
the Shimp syllogism should work well in Florida. A line of Florida
cases recognizes the legal premise, i.e., the employer's duty.16 6 The
Florida Supreme Court held that the common-law doctrine gives an
employer "a positive duty to provide his servant with reasonably
safe. . .places to work. '16 7 Whether a Florida employer has breached
this duty is determined by weighing the risk of injury against the utility
of the condition.168 Whatever utility exists, if any exists at all, in allowing high levels of tobacco smoke to permeate the workplace could
not possibly outweigh the risk of harm to all employees, including those
who smoke. 6 9
57 Pa. Commw. at 302, 426 A.2d at 721 (emphasis added). Without this presumption,
a plaintiff has the burden of proving a sufficient health detriment exists justifying termination. Id. Because the claimant in Ruckstuhl had produced only her doctor's statement that she is allergic to tobacco smoke, the court ruled that she had not met her
burden. Id. Arguably, a similarly situated plaintiff could prevail under the Pennsylvania law by providing the existing medical evidence demonstrating serious physical
harm. See supra text accompanying notes 59-62.
162. 104 Cal. App. 3d 97, 163 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1980).
163. Id. at 99-100, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 100, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
166. See Camp v. Hall 39 Fla. 535, 22 So. 792 (1897); Stearns & Culver Lumber Co. v. Fowler, 58 Fla. 362, 50 So. 680 (1909); McGee v. Ed De Brauwere & Co.,
117 Fla. 859, 162 So. 510 (1935) Richards Co. v. Harrison, 262 So. 2d 258 (Fla. Ist
Dist. Ct. App. 1972) cert. denied, 268 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1972).
167. Hicks v. Kemp, 79 So. 2d 696, 699 (Fla. 1955).
168. Bartholf v. Baker, 71 So. 2d 480, 482 (Fla. 1954).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 11-77 (reviewing many of the risks of
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One may suggest that the utility involves respecting the rights of
workers to smoke. On the issue of a safe workplace, however, recognizing smokers' rights may be inappropriate. Even though an employer
may wish to respect an individual's desire to assume the risks of tobacco smoking, an argument still exists that the employer has the duty
to provide even the smoker with a safe place to work by protecting that
individual from tobacco smoke during working hours. This is analogous
to an individual who chooses not to wear a seat belt while driving his
private car. The employer of this individual still has a positive duty to
require that individual to wear a seat belt while operating a dangerous
instrumentality on the job. Therefore, the issue is not the rights of
smokers versus the rights of nonsmokers in the workplace. The issue is
whether the presence of tobacco smoke in the workplace creates an unsafe environment for all workers regardless of anyone's desire to assume the risks of the condition.
A Florida plaintiff has another potential basis for recovery. In addition to the available medical and scientific evidence he can use to
establish the harm to any person exposed to tobacco smoke, a complaining party may refer to the preamble of Florida Statutes section
255.27,170 regulating smoking in state.buildings. The preamble states in
part: "[E]ven low levels of tobacco smoke in stagnant room air constitutes a substantial health hazard. . ., and. . . [the nonsmoker's] right
to be free of annoying and possibly harmful tobacco smoke. . .should
be protected.
...
"171 Even though the plaintiff may not be invoking
Florida Statutes section 255.27, the preamble is still useful as persuasive authority. Preambles demonstrate, at the very least, the legislature's concern, intent, and purpose in enacting legislation.17 2
To avoid the particular sensitivity basis for rejection of Ms.
Gordon's complaint, 73 the Florida plaintiff must plead the harm of tobacco smoke to everyone exposed to it, and produce scientific affidavits.
In addition, he should refer to the third paragraph of the section
255.27 preamble which states, "persons with allergies, respiratory ailments, and other related infirmities are adversely affected by tobacco

harm).
§ 255.27 (1983).
1977 Fla. Laws 73, ch.77-52 (emphasis added).
For a discussion of the various effects and uses of preambles, see Note, Legal Effect of Preables--Statutes,41 CORNELL L.Q. 134 (1955).
173. See supra text accompanying note 124. Pleading particular sensitivity was
Ms. Gordon's nemesis.
170.
171.
172.

FLA. STAT.
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smoke which results in the state and private industry incurring each
year substantial losses in productivity due to days lost by personnel, not
to mention the personal suffering and inconvenience of those affected ..

."71 Perhaps this language provides the nexus and author-

ity the Gordon court believed it lacked to extend the common-law duty
to include those with particular sensitivities.
IV.

Florida's Need for a Clean Indoor Air Act

Both Gordon v. Raven Systems and Research, Inc.,175 and Federal
76
Employees for Nonsmokers' Rights (FENSR) v. United States suggest that the issue of defining nonsmokers' rights should be determined
by a legislative body rather than a court.'" While the more accurate
view is that a court has the power to recognize the rights of nonsmokers
under existing laws and should not hesitate to do so when called upon,
the legislature is undoubtedly the better forum to define those rights.
Before 1974 no state had ever enacted comprehensive smoking regulations designed to assure air quality or protect the health of those who
do not smoke.' 78 What regulations did exist were usually designed for
fire or explosion prevention or for the protection of minors.' 79 Only after publication of the 1972 Surgeon General's report and subsequent
medical studies did legislatures have reason to begin recognizing rights
of nonsmokers. Since then, however, the movement towards legislative
recognition of these rights gained rapid momentum. Between 1974 and
1980 twenty-five states enacted comprehensive anti-smoking statutes
designed to protect nonsmokers from involuntary exposure to harmful
tobacco smoke, 80 three states enacted piecemeal groups of anti-smok174.

1977 Fla. Laws 73, ch. 77-52.

175. 462 A.2d 10 (D.C. 1983).
176. 446 F. Supp. 181 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 598 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979).
177. Gordon, 462 A.2d at 14; FENSR, 446 F. Supp. at 185.
178. See Comment, The Legal Conflict Between Smokers and Nonsmokers: The
Majestic Vice Versus the Right to Clean Air, 45 Mo. L. REV. 444, 452 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Legal Conflict].

179.
180.

Id. at 453.
Id. at 451, 452.

§§ 18.35.300, .310, .320, .330, .340 (Cum. Supp.
§ 36-601.01 (1974); ARK STAT. ANN. §§
82-3701 TO -3703 (Cum. Supp. 1979); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-14-101 to
ALASKA STAT.

1979); ARIz.

REV. STAT. ANN.

-105 (Cum. Supp. 1978); (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.. §§ 1-21b
(West Cum. Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN § 26-9910 (1977); HAWAII
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ing statutes,1 8 1 and seven states enacted laws protecting nonsmokers'
rights in very limited areas.18 2 Thirteen other states still had restrictions for traditional reasons,' 8 3 and three states had no restrictions.' 8 4

REV. STAT. §§321-201 to -206 (1976); IOWA CODE §§ 98A.1-.6 (Supp.
1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4008 (Cum. Supp. 1979); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 270, §21 (West Cum. Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
144.411-.417 (West Supp. 1980); 1979 Mont. Laws ch. 368; NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 71-5701 to -5713 (Supp. 1979); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 202.2490.2492 (1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 155.42 (Supp. 1979); N.J. REV.
STAT. § 2C:33-13 (Supp. 1979); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 1399-o to -q
(McKinney Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-12-09 to -11 (1978);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 379.031 (Page Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 1247 (West Supp. 1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-56-1, -2 (CUMM.
Supp. 1978); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-36-1, -2 (1979); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 48.01 (Vernon Supp. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN.

§§ 76-10-101 to -110 (Cum. Supp. 1975); 248 WAC 152 (1975) (Washington state regulations).

Legal Conflict, supra note 178, at 450 n.57.
181. Legal Conflict, supra note 178, at 452.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 38A, § 23 (1957) (fireworks), art. 43, § 54-I (1957)
(physicians' offices, nursing homes, hospitals), art. 43, § 200 (1957) (food
canning), art. 78, § 35A (Supp. 1979) (buses), art. 89, § 64 (1957) (elevators); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 333.21333 (1980) (homes for the aged),
333.21531 (1980) (hospitals), 333.21733 (1980) (nursing homes), 408.820
(Supp. 1980) (elevators), 289.707a (Supp. 1980) (retail food establishments), 333.12905 (1980) (restaurants), 289.129 (1967) (canneries); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 243.345, .350 (1979) (state offices), 192.710 (1979) (public
meetings), 441.815 (1979) (hospitals), 479.015 (1979) (elevators).
Legal Conflict, supra note 178, at 451 n.57.
182. Legal Conflict, supra note 178, at 452
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25940, 25940.5, 25941 to 25947 (West
Supp. 1980) (certain areas in publicly owned buildings); CAL. PUB. UTIL.
CODE § 561 (West Supp. 1980) (public transportation) (California's Clean
Indoor Air Act, ch.10.7, was rejected at the general election held Nov. 7,
1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1326 (1979) (buses); D.C. CODE ANN. §
44-216 (Supp. 1978) (public transportation); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-5904 to 5906 (1979) (public meetings); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-35-1(4), (7) (1972)
(buses); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 361 (Purdon Supp. 1980) (hospitals);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 3702 (Purdon 1972) (retail stores); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 35, § 1225 (Purdon 1977) (theatres, public assemblies); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 47.56.730 (Supp. 1980) (ferries).
Legal Conflict, supra note 178, at 451 n.57.
183. Legal Conflict, supra note 178, at 452
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 96 , § 2105 (Smith-Hurd 1979) (mines); ILL. ANN.
STAT.RECOVERY CH.127 , § 109 (SMITH-HURD CUM. SUPP. 1976) (FIREWORKS); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1-22-21, 16-6-4-23 (BURNS 1973) (FOOD
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Not surprisingly, states in or near the tobacco belt generally fall into
the latter two categories.
A.

Smokers' and Nonsmokers' Rights Distinguished

As discussed in section three of this note, apparently the fundamental rights afforded under the United States Constitution do not include the right to a smoke-free environment.1 85 Likewise, of course,
there is no fundamental right to smoke tobacco. In other words, neither
the smoker nor the nonsmoker can rely directly on the Constitution to
resolve the conflict. The state and local governments may, however, use
their police power to define and regulate the rights of smokers and nonsmokers. Nothing is more vital to a state than the health, safety and
welfare of its citizens.
A suggestion made earlier is that when applying the common-law
doctrine of the employer's duty, comparing nonsmokers' and smokers'
rights may be improper since the hazardous condition rather than competing rights is at issue. 186 In legislating, however, comparing the rights
of smokers and nonsmokers is a proper consideration since the competing rights are as issue.
Freedom is a basic presumption of our society. Generally, individPROCESSED OR STORED); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 352.170(3) (Baldwin
1977) (mines); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 438.050 (Baldwin Cum. Supp.
1978) (school premises); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416(a) (West Supp.
1980) (school premises); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2433 (1964)

(mills, buses, factories, shipyards; fire prevention in mind); RSMo §
320.130 (1978) (fireworks); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 63-7-2, -3, 63-14-17
(1974) (mines); S.C. CODE §§ 23-35-90, -100 (1976) (fireworks); S.C.
CODE § 59-67-150 (1976) (school bus); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-3011
(1977) (fireworks); TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-6-103(B), 09(J), -510(A), -7106 (1980) (MINES); TENN. CODE ANN, §§ 59-7-108(h) (1980) (magazine); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2752 (1968) (building with sign posted;
fire prevention measure); V.A. CODE §3.1-379 (1973) (food processing);
V.A. CODE § 45.1-39 (1974) (MAGAZINES); V.A. CODE § 45.1-98 (1974 &
Cum. Supp. 1979) (mines); W. VA. CODE § 21-3-8 (1978) (factories, mercantile establishments); W. VA. CODE § 16-9-7 (1979) (schools); W. VA.

§ 22-2-57(b) (1978) (mines); W. VA. CODE § 22-2-53 (1978) (mine
surface); Wyo. STAT. § 30-6-107 (1977) (mines).
Legal Conflict, supra note 178, at 451 n.57.
184. Legal Conflict, supra note 178, at 452. "Alabama, North Carolina, and
Wisconsin." Legal Conflict, supra note 178, at 451 n.57.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 78-92.
186. See supra text following note 169.
CODE
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uals have the right to engage in lawful activities and to use their own
free will and discretion in determining the extent of that engagement.
This right includes the right to take risks. Nevertheless, the right of
personal autonomy is not absolute.1 7 Not only may a state regulate,
restrict or even prevent an otherwise lawful activity if the regulation
bears any rational relationship to a legitimate state interest; 88 a state
may also impinge a fundamental right if the restriction is necessary to
further a compelling state interest. 89 Presently the smoking of tobacco
products is a lawful activity, but probably not a fundamental right.
Therefore, a state may restrict or prevent the right to smoke if the
prevention or restriction is rationally related to furthering a legitimate
state interest. The health, safety, and well-being of citizens is at the
very least a legitimate state interest. 190
Once a legislature recognizes the scientific and medical evidence
that secondary smoke is a health hazard, the question is not whether
smoking should be restricted, but where and when.' 9 ' The simple answer is by whatever regulation is reasonably designed to enhance the
goal of protecting the health, safety and well-being of the citizens. Perhaps the most reasonable general rule is that individuals should have
the right to smoke only when and where the act does not endanger the
health and safety of others. Certainly this is exactly the standard used
in other types of legislation. For example, individuals may lawfully operate motor vehicles, but only under clearly-defined conditions which
vary according to place and time and under the threat of penalties for
violations. The restrictions extend from the rationale that individuals
have the right to operate motor vehicles only to the extent they do so
without endangering the safety of others. The rationale of anti-smoking
laws should be commensurate with this. The rights of smokers to endanger their own bodies should end when their acts begin to endanger
187. Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 89-90 (1890); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 154 (1973); see also Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) (even one's hair
length may be regulated).
188. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-86 (197Q) (discussing the
rational basis-legitimate interest standards).
189. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (discussing the higher
level of strict scrutiny applied to fundamental rights).
190. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981) states: "Protection of health and safety of the public is a paramount governmental interest. . . ." Id. at 300.
191. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:3D-1,7,15 (West Supp. 1984) (emphasis
added).
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others. Some states have implemented this rationale by passing Clean
Indoor Air Acts; others, like Florida, have not.
B.

The Inadequacy of Present Legislative Measures

Florida has two statutes designed to restrict smoking. One must
hesitate to describe them as anti-smoking statutes since neither affords
great protection from tobacco smoke.
1. FloridaStatutes Section 823.12
Florida Statutes section 823.12192 makes smoking in elevators a
second degree misdemeanor. Of course, because there is rarely any prohibition against smoking before getting on an elevator or after getting
off, the law is often ignored. At least one person, however, received a
$250 fine for blowing smoke in the face of another elevator occupant
who had requested that he extinguish his cigar.1 93 This is a good law,
but in the absence of other restrictions, it does little to promote public
health. People spend a small fraction of their time on elevators.
2.

FloridaStatutes Section 255.27

Florida Statutes section 255.27,9 enacted in 1977, represents
Florida's first real attempt at anti-smoking legislation. The statute's
preamble in very strong language recognizes: 1) the potential health
hazard of "even low levels of tobacco smoke. . ." 2) the "right to be
free of. . .tobacco smoke. . ." and 3) the potential loss of worker pro-

ductivity from exposure to tobacco smoke. 195 The statute itself, however, falls far short of the preamble's stated aspirations. Under this
statute, "[t]he supervisor of each unit of government located in a government building shall establish rules governing smoking in that portion of the building for which he is responsible." 196
Section 255.27 gives the government supervisor guidelines to follow, but these guidelines appear more permissive of smoking than restrictive. For example, in conference rooms and auditoriums,
192. FLA. STAT. § 823.12 (1983).
193. Legal Conflict, supra note 178, at 458 (citing Good Housekeeping, Apr.
1979, at 118).
194. FLA. STAT. § 255.27 (1983).
195. 1977 Fla. Laws 73, ch. 77-52 (emphasis added).
196. FLA. STAT. § 255.27 (1983).
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"[s]eparate smoking and nonsmoking areas shall be set aside.' 1 97 This
means smoking is still permitted in these rooms, only not on certain
sides. Considering the physical qualities of tobacco smoke and how it
rapidly permeates a room, one realizes that dividing a room provides no
real protection.' 98 Furthermore, "[t]here will be no limitation on smoking in corridors, lobbies, and restrooms." 99 Common sense suggests
that these areas are often the smallest and least ventilated of a building. Unless nonsmokers who use or work in state buildings can miraculously avoid these areas, they are assured of exposure to high levels of
tobacco smoke.
In fact, Florida Statutes section 255.27 does not guarantee that
individuals will be totally free from tobacco smoke in any area. In medical care facilities smoking is "restricted to staff, lounges, private offices, and specially designated areas.' 200 Apparently, this "specially
designated areas" language permits a supervisor to divide all open
rooms into smoking and nonsmoking sides, thereby creating the same
problem as discussed with conference rooms. In designating nonsmoking areas, the supervisor is required to consider only "the individual
characteristics of the building or room such as size, ventilation, the
purposes for which it is utilized, and other criteria relating to public
health, safety and comfort." '0 The law does not guarantee that any
area will be absolutely void of tobacco smoke.
Florida Statutes section 255.27 suffers from two other even greater
deficiencies. First, the law does not provide penalties for violations. Secondly, whatever smoking restrictions do exist for the protection of public health apply only in state government buildings or offices leased by
the state government. No other public places are affected.
In short, the Florida Legislature formally recognizes that tobacco
smoke is a serious public health hazard only when inhaled in certain
unspecified areas of state government buildings. However, it is doubtful
that the toxic effect of tobacco smoke discriminates in such a manner.
Florida should recognize, as other states have, that tobacco smoke is a
detriment to public health and welfare regardless of where or when
197. Id. § 255.27(1) (emphasis added).
198. Lefcoe, Ashley, Pederson & Keays, The Health Risks of Passive Smoking
and the Growing Case for Control Measurements in Enclosed Environments, 84
CHEST, July 1, 1983, at 93 (smoke permeates entire room.).
199. FLA. STAT. § 255.27(3) (1981).
200. Id. § 255.27(2) (emphasis added).
201. Id. § 255.27(4).
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inhaled. Florida needs to follow through to the logical conclusion of its
declarations stated in the preamble to Florida Statutes section 255.27
and enact a comprehensive Clean Indoor Air Act.
C.

Elements to be Included in Florida's Comprehensive Legislative Response

Like any effective legislation, anti-smoking legislation must make
a clear statement of its intent and purpose, define terms, places, and
conditions under which smoking will be permitted, require adequate
posting of regulations, authorize individuals and agencies to enforce the
regulations, and provide adequate penalties for violations. 0a This section discusses these elements and illustrates how some selected antismoking laws have employed them. In addition, this section raises a
new issue concerning legislative protection of children from passive
smoking. The Florida Legislature should use the discussion as a guide
and should satisfy all elements in its Clean Indoor Air Act.
1. Intent and Purpose
Effective legislation should make clear the reasons and intent of
the restrictions. Such a statement is useful for interpretation and implementation of restrictions. The best method is to incorporate the intent as part of the statute. For example, Colorado Revised Statutes
section 24-14-101 states: "Legislative declaration. The general assembly hereby declares that the smoking of tobacco. . .under certain conditions is a matter of public concern and that in order to protect the
public health, safety and welfare it is necessary to control such smoking
in certain public places." 0 3
Perhaps the strongest statement of purpose of any anti-smoking
legislation appears in the newly-enacted city of San Francisco's Smoking Pollution Control Ordinance.20 4 Section 1001 of this ordinance
states:
Because the smoking of tobacco.
202. See
AND

PuBLIC HEALTH SERVICE,
DIGEST

WELFARE, THE SMOKING

. .

is a danger to health and is a

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION
83 (1979) [hereinafter cited as SMOKING

DIGEST].

203. COLO. REV. STAT. § 245-14-101 (1982).
204.
(1983).

SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUN. CODE part
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the purposes of

this article are (1) to protect the public health and welfare by regulating smoking in the office workplace and (2) to minimize the
toxic effects of smoking. . .by requiring an employer to adopt a
policy that will accommodate, insofar as possible, the preferences
of nonsmokers and smokers and, if a satisfactory accommodation
cannot be reached, to prohibit smoking in the office workplace. 05
The section further emphasizes that the ordinance does not "create any
right to smoke .
,,,206 nor does it prevent an employer from banning
20
smoking altogether. 7 The spirit of the ordinance merely allows an employer to attempt satisfying all employees, smokers, and nonsmokers.
However, this attempt at accommodating everyone does not imply
striking a balance or compromise. On the contrary, the ordinance
makes very clear that the right to be free from smoke is superior to the
right to smoke. 208 Any smoking policy set by an employer must satisfy
207
all nonsmoking employees.
2. Definitions and Restrictions
Most essential to any clean indoor air act are its definitions and
restrictions. Enforcement of any regulation requires knowing exactly
what is restricted and where it is restricted. For example, the term
smoking requires precise definition. Because the most harmful smoke
emanates from the burning ends of tobacco products and equipment,
the definition of "smoking" should include not only inhaling and exhaling but also the burning or carrying of any lighted tobacco or other
smoking product. 10 Other important terms include public place, public
meeting, office, workplace, building, and enclosed area.2 ' It may even
be appropriate to define for purposes of protecting children, "private
'212
home" and "automobile.
Of course, the actual regulations are the most critical. Many antismoking regulations enumerate areas where smoking is prohibited.213
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at § 1001.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 1003(1)(b).
Id. (emphasis added).
See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-14-102(3) (1982).
Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 236-42.
See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-14-103 (1982).
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The most common areas listed include elevators, theaters, libraries,
buses, waiting rooms, government buildings, schools, etc.214 While these
lists have the benefit of making the restricted areas somewhat clear,
their exclusionary method unfortunately promulgates the traditional
presumption that smoking is permitted anywhere unless otherwise
provided.
The Minnesota Clear Indoor Air Act, 15 the leading comprehensive state statute to date, takes a refreshing approach. Minnesota Statutes section 144.414 states, "[n]o person shall smoke in a public place
' The Act
or at a public meeting except in designated smoking areas."216
defines a public place "as any enclosed, indoor area used by the general
public or serving as a place of work ....
,217 In effect, the Minnesota
Clean Indoor Air Act reverses the traditional presumption. Smoking is
prohibited in public unless an area has been set aside for smoking.
Nonsmokers are assured of clear indoor air in common, public areas,
but some areas may be set aside for smoking if certain precautions are
taken. This approach is the most reasonable, and one Florida should
follow.
The Minnesota Act exempts some areas. Private enclosed offices
are not subject to the restriction, and neither are "factories, warehouses
and similar places of work not usually frequented by the general public,
except that the [labor deparment and. . .health commissioner]. . .shall establish rules to restrict or prohibit smoking. . .where
the close proximity of workers or inadequacy of ventilation causes
smoke pollution .... ,,218 Furthermore, the Minnesota section providing for designation of smoking areas requires the use of "physical barriers and ventilation systems. . .to minimize the toxic effect of smoke
in adjacent non-smoking areas."2 19
The controversial San Francisco ordinance requires office employers operating businesses within the city to establish and enforce a written smoking policy. 220 As discussed earlier, employers may attempt to
accommodate smokers, but if ventilation or separation is insufficient to
protect all nonsmokers, total abolition of smoking is required.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id.
144.411 (West Supp. 1983).
144.414.
144.413.(2)
144.414 (emphasis added).
144.415.
FRANCISCO, CAL., MUN. CODE part II, ch. V, art. 19 § 1003 (1983).

MINN. STAT. ANN. §

Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
SAN
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3.

Enforcement

A major problem with anti-smoking legislation is the lack of adequate enforcement provisions.
Of course, most people obey laws;
therefore, the mere enactment of an anti-smoking law coupled with
greater public awareness of the reasons and purposes of the law may
achieve substantial public compliance. But more is needed. While one
has difficulty imagining police officers using smoke detectors to catch
recalcitrant tobacco smokers as they use radar to catch speeding motorists, effective anti-smoking laws do require adequate and enforceable
fines and penalties.
Enforcement provisions vary greatly, even among states with extensive anti-smoking laws.222 For example, although the Colorado statute gives a strong anti-smoking declaration, defines essential terms, lists
extensive restrictions for certain public places, creates optional prohibitions, and makes clear that local governments may regulate even more
extensively than the state statute, it fails to provide a section for enforcement.223 Several states have made a violation a petty misdemeanor.224 Alaska may fine an individual violator of its anti-smoking
act between $5 and $25,25 and managers of buildings or others responsible for enforcing restrictions may be fined between $10 and $100.226
New Jersey fines individuals up to $100, and fines those responsible
with enforcement $25 for the first offense, $100 for the second, and
$200 for each offense thereafter.227
Sometimes statutes make clear who may enforce the restrictions
and by what methods. The California Clean Indoor Air Act,228 for example, permits an individual to apply for a writ of mandate to comply
with the restrictions.229 If the plaintiff is successful, not only must the
entity enforce the restrictions, but the plaintiff will also receive reason221.

SMOKING DIGEST,

222.

Id. at 84-86.

supra note 202, at 84.

223. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-14-101 (1982).
224. See e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.417 (West Supp. 1983); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 71-5712 (1981) (Nebraska's Clean Indoor Air Act is almost identical to
Minnesota's.).
225. ALASKA STAT. § 18.35.340(a) (1982).
226. Id. § 18.35.340(b). Proprietors must also post conspicuous no smoking
signs. Id. § 18.35.330.
227. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:32D-4,12,20 (West Supp. 1984).
228. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25940 (Deering Supp. 1983).
229.

Id. § 25945.
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able costs and attorney's fees.230 Other statutes provide that an "affected party" may file suit to enjoin violators. 3
The San Francisco ordinance appears to have the strictest enforcement provisions. Employers who fail to institute and enforce a written
smoking policy which satisfies all nonsmokers may receive up to a $500
fine. 32 In addition, "[e]ach day such violation is committed or permitted to continue shall constitute a separate offense and shall be punishable as such. ' 23 3 The enforcement provision also requires the Director of
Public Health to enforce the ordinance by serving notices to violators
2 34
and having the city attorney sue to enjoin violators.
The San Francisco ordinance takes a serious approach to enforcing
an otherwise easy-to-ignore ordinance. Most nonsmokers find it difficult
to speak up about violations. Many would rather suffer the health consequences and annoyance than risk alienation. Under this ordinance
suits are brought in the name of the city rather than an individual employee.23 5 The burden is on the employer to institute and enforce a policy on behalf of the nonsmokers. Knowledge of the potential for huge
fines for continued violations makes what is good for the nonsmoker
good for the employer.
4. Protectionfor Children
In her cover letter submitting the 1980 Surgeon General's report
to the House of Representatives, Patricia Roberts Harris, Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare, stated: "Perhaps more disheartening
[than the harm tobacco smoke has on women] is the harm which
mothers' smoking causes to their unborn babies and infants. '2 36 A possible emerging issue is whether parental smoking should be restricted to
times when and places where children are not present. Arguably a relationship between parental smoking in the child's environment and the
negligent treatment of children exists. Florida's negligent treatment of
230. Id.
231.
232.

See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.417(3) (West Supp. 1983).
SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUN. CODE part II, ch. V, art. 19 § 1005(2)

(1983).
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id.
Id. § 1005(1).
Id. § 1005(2).
Letter from Patricia Roberts Harris to Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.

(printed inside front cover of
HEALTH AND

WOMEN

HUMAN

PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES,

SERVICES,

U.S.

THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES

DEPARTMENT

OF

OF SMOKING FOR

(1980)).
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children statute provides in part: "Whoever permits a child to live in an
environment.

to be.

.

. . [which]

causes the child's physical or emotional health

.in danger of being significantly impaired shall be guilty of a

misdemeanor of the second degree ...

23

Medical evidence demon-

strates that children who live in smoke-filled homes are in danger of
significant physical impairment.2 38
Although a government walks on thin ice when it attempts to regulate parental control and management of their children, the serious
detrimental effect parental smoking has on children arguably should
not be ignored. On the one hand is the traditional notion of the right of
parents to raise their children without state interference.23 9 On the
other hand, states are enacting legislation designed to protect nonsmokers, and yet no provisions exist to protect children, the group of
nonsmokers who may be in most need of protection. The Supreme
Court has stated: "we have recognized that a state is not without constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children
when their physical or mental health is jeopardized."240 In the same
opinion the Court stated, "[tihe statist notion that governmental power
should supersede parental authority in all cases because some parents
abuse and neglect children is repugnant to American tradition."241
The dilemma is not easily resolved. It would be unrealistic to expect Florida agencies to prosecute parents who smoke cigarettes in
their own homes, whether under the child neglect statute or otherwise.
It is realistic, however, to expect Florida to protect children by educating the public and focusing attention on the harm passive smoking has
237. FLA. STAT. § 827.05 (1983).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 62-75 for a review of medical evidence
of harm to children from passive smoking.
Additionally, it could be argued that the dangers to children rise to the level of
child abuse. FLA. STAT. § 827.04(2) (1983) states: "Whoever . . . knowingly or by
culpable negligence, permits physical or mental injury to the child, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor of the first degree. . . ." Also, FLA. STAT. § 827.04(1) (1983) states:
"Whoever . . . knowingly or by culpable negligence, permits physical injury to the

child, and in so doing causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent
disfigurement to such child, shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree. . .

."

Id.

239. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 601-02 (1979); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 165-66 (1944). In Prince, the Court spoke of "the parent's claim to authority
in her own household and in the rearing of her children." 321 U.S. at 165. "Against
these sacred private interests, basic in a democracy, stand the interest of society to
protect the welfare of children ... " Id.
240. Parham, 442 U.S. at 603.
241. Id. (emphasis original).
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on children. One of the many ways this may be accomplished is to
include a provision in a Clean Indoor Air Act advising parents and
other adults not to smoke in enclosed areas when children are present,
for example, the home and automobile. Even without active enforcement, such a provision may open "those pages of human experience
'242
that teach that parents generally do act in the child's best interest.
5.

Proposal

A Florida Clean Indoor Act should include a clear statement of
intent and the following minimum protections: 1) prohibit smoking in
all places open to the public, exempting only designated rooms where
nonsmokers realistically need not be present; 2) guarantee all nonsmokers a smoke-free workplace; 3) provide adequate enforcement and
penalty provisions; and 4) lead the nation in protecting the health of
infants by restricting parental smoking in areas when children are present. The act should permit municipalities to place further restrictions
on smoking, but not permit them to create exemptions.
V.

Conclusion

Twenty years ago the United States Surgeon General officially informed the public of the dangers of tobacco smoke. Since that first
report, hundreds of medical studies have linked tobacco smoke to a
multitude of serious illnesses, and today tobacco smoking is recognized
as the number one cause of premature death and disability in
America. 43 Included in these findings is the discovery that secondary
tobacco smoke pollutes the air and is a significant health hazard to
nonsmokers. Using this as an underlying premise, nonsmokers have
sought legal remedies in their campaign for clean air. Nonsmokers do
not attack the privilege of smokers to assume the risks of tobacco
smoking. The issue nonsmokers present is whether an individual has
the right to take a risk which concomitantly involves an unavoidable
risk of harm to others near him. Nonsmokers argue that the privilege
to smoke, as with any other privilege, must end when its exercise endangers the health and safety of others. Smokers should have the burden to smoke only in areas where nonsmokers are not present. The free
242.

Id. at 602.

243.
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choice of one should not take away the free choice and good health of
another.
Although no court has yet recognized a constitutional right to be
free from the dangers of tobacco smoke exposure, some nonsmokers
have achieved smoke-free workplaces under the employer's commonlaw duty to provide each employee a safe place to work. While piecemeal remedies through the courts applying this theory hold promise,
the better forum for granting relief is the legislature. In 1964 only half
of the population believed smoking should be restricted in certain
places, but in 1975 seventy percent favored controls.244 In all likelihood
that figure is even larger today. Responding to the medical evidence
and desire of the majority, half of the states have enacted comprehensive legislation prohibiting smoking in public places. Regrettably, Florida has not. Pursuant to its power and duty to protect the health and
welfare of its citizens, the Florida Legislature should enact a Florida
Clean Indoor Air Act.
Curtis R. Cowan

244.

SMOKING DIGEST,

supra note 202, at 8.
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